This article tests whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") 
INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX")' was adopted in haste, leaving businessmen, academics, and legislators to repent at leisure. 2 In the name of investor confidence, SOX regulates lawyers, accountants, auditors, investment bankers, securities analysts, corporate directors and officers, stock exchanges, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, and a variety of other governmental and non-governmental bodies, organizations, and professions. It applies to all U.S. public companies and to foreign companies cross-listed in the United States on levels 2 and 3 ("level-23 companies"). 3 It does not apply to foreign companies that are traded in the United States on cross-listing levels 1 and 4 ("level-14 companies"). 4 It is hard to assess whether investors believed SOX was good or bad on average for U.S. firms. Events surrounding the adoption of SOX often corre-sponded to price changes in U.S. markets, but one cannot rule out other causes. 5 Likewise, while the aftermath of SOX was marked by an increasing number of U.S. public companies going private 6 or going "dark,"' contemporaneous events might have been partly responsible for these trends.
The effect of SOX on cross-listed firms is easier to assess. First, crosscountry data make it easier to rule out competing explanations in studies of delistings and reduced cross-listing rates. 8 Second, statistics about the trends in cross-listing on other countries' exchanges (especially London, the new cross-listing destination of choice) inform our judgment on whether the flight from U.S. exchanges was connected to SOX. 9 Third, for cross-listed firms we have a more reliable way of controlling for contemporaneous events through the use of difference-in-differences methodology, following a method I developed in a prior paper.' 0 My difference-in-differences solution is based on the differential application of SOX to otherwise similar foreign public companies. Because SOX applies to level-23 foreign companies ("treatment" group), but not to level-14 or unlisted foreign companies (two "control" groups), we have a natural experiment unavailable for U.S. firms.
In a prior paper, I compare a "treatment" set of level-23 companies from thirty-six countries to a "control" set of similar non-cross-listed companies (same country, same industry, similar in size) and to a second "control" set of level-14 companies from the same country. I find that stock prices of level-23 companies declined (increased) significantly, compared to both control groups, during key announcements indicating that SOX would (would not) fully apply to level-23 companies. I also find variation in the reactions of level-23 firms. The negative reaction to SOX is strong for companies with high scores on a disclosure index produced contemporaneously by Standard & Poor's ("S&P") and for firms located in well-governed countries (using as proxies Europe, the median S&P disclosure score for all firms from each country, and each country's GDP per capita). The negative reaction is weaker for faster-growing firms. That is, for high-disclosing companies from well-governed countries, investors expected SOX to be particularly bad. For fast-growing, low-disclosing firms, SOX may have been neutral or even positive, on average, especially if those firms are located in poorly governed countries."
In this paper, I extend my prior research to the question of cross-listing premia. Historically, cross-listed companies traded at a premium to similar non-cross-listed companies." Traditional explanations-that cross-listing minimized costs created by market segmentation-have been undermined by the decline in segmentation brought by improvements in communications technologies. More recent research explains the cross-listing premium as due to legal bonding, where a high-quality company from a country with poor corporate governance credibly signals its quality and commits to good behavior by subjecting itself to the stricter laws, regulations, accounting rules, and listing standards of another country. 3 Such a commitment to highquality governance may be valuable to firms' controlling investors, who, in exchange for giving up secrecy and opportunities for self-dealing, reduce a firm's costs of capital. The bonding theory predicts, and researchers find, higher cross-listing premia for level-23 companies than for less-regulated level-14 companies. 4 If part of a level-23 firm's premium is determined by the quality of the U.S. governance regime, then, we can infer investors' reactions to SOX by comparing before-and after-SOX premia. Similar to Doidge and his coauthors, ' I measure the cross-listing premium as the difference between the Tobin's q of firms subject to SOX (cross-listed on levels 2 or 3) and the Tobin's q of the two control groups of firms not subject to SOX (non-crosslisted or cross-listed on levels 1 or 4). As a robustness check, I also compare market-to-book ratios of firms subject to SOX and firms not subject to SOX. I find that both Tobin's q and market-to-book ratios of level-23 companies declined significantly during 2002 relative to level-14 companies and 11. Id. relative to non cross-listed companies. The Tobin's q and market-to-book ratios of level-14 companies declined slightly (generally insignificantly) relative to non-cross-listed companies, and increased in some specifications. These results are robust across a variety of empirical specifications. Thus, the premium associated with trading in the United States was roughly constant, while the premium associated with being subject to U.S. regulation declined.
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The declines in Tobin's q vary based on company and country characteristics. This variation is generally consistent with the hypothesis that well-governed firms suffered larger losses. The declines are larger for more profitable firms, for firms with a higher level of pre-SOX disclosure, for firms located in countries with higher levels of overall disclosure and higher GDPs per capita, and for firms in European countries. Smaller companies suffered larger declines, consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work reporting a size-based impact of SOX. '6 Riskier firms suffered larger declines as well, consistent with the view that SOX induces firms to reduce risk, possibly below optimal levels. The results for marketto-book ratios are consistent with the Tobin's q results, but they are less often statistically significant.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the existing literature on cross-listing premia and develops testable hypotheses linking cross-listing premia to investors' reaction to SOX. Parts II and III discuss my sample and methodology. Part IV presents results. Part V proposes a "comply or explain" policy for level-23 firms that could help evaluate which provisions of SOX are thought by investors to be beneficial and which are thought to be detrimental.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOX AND THE CROSS-LISTING PREMIUM

A. Implications of the Cross-Listing Premium for Regulatory Quality
The cross-listing literature suggests there are two principal reasons why firms might decide to list on a foreign stock exchange: (i) to obtain greater liquidity for their shares and greater access to investor capital; and (ii) to bond the company to a better overall corporate governance regime (a combination of legal rules, securities regulations, accounting rules, listing standards, and analyst coverage). Recent research emphasizes the importance of the second, bonding explanation. The payoff to companies for cross-listing may come partly through increased ability to issue new shares or to conduct share-financed acquisitions, even without an increase in equilibrium share price. But an important part of the payoff is a higher share price. Prior research finds that both level-23 companies and level-14 companies trade at a premium to apparently similar non-cross-listed companies, with level-23 companies enjoying a higher premium than level-14 companies. Tobin's q is a common way to measure this premium' 9 and is the principal measure I rely on in this paper. As a robustness check, I also use the market-to-book ratio.
The cross-listing premium varies over time, so it clearly depends on more than just the quality of the listing country's governance regime. Moreover, the premium is partly endogenous-firms that would in any case merit a higher premium are more likely to cross-list. Still, prior research suggests a remaining, plausibly causal effect, in which cross-listed firms trade at higher prices because there are net benefits to cross-listing.
The cross-listing premium is important to study for two largely distinct reasons. First, cross-listing has important costs (compliance with stricter governance and accounting rules; exposure to the threat of shareholder litigation, which is common in the United States and rare elsewhere, and so on). The premium is one of the principal benefits to foreign firms considering cross-listing, and might offset the incremental costs. If the premium declines, the competitiveness of U.S. securities markets presumably declines as well.
Second, if changes in the cross-listing premium can be tied to regulatory changes, they provide a rare opportunity to assess the quality of the regulatory changes as perceived by investors. If SOX truly provided a boost to investor confidence, the premia for level-23 companies should have risen after its adoption, as compared to the premia for level-14 companies. If it created greater regulatory cost than regulatory benefit, the level-23 premia should have fallen, and the wisdom of the regulatory change should perhaps be reconsidered.
My research design addresses only the apparent value of SOX for cross-listed firms. I do not address the value of SOX for U.S. firms. I study cross-listed firms in large part because the comparison of the treatment group of level-23 companies to the control groups of level-14 companies and non-cross-listed companies provides a reasonably direct measure of the impact of SOX that is not available for U.S. firms.
It is possible that SOX had net costs for cross-listed firms (at least those from well-governed countries), but net benefits for U.S. firms. Still, if the net cost of SOX for foreign firms from well-governed countries can be es- tablished, this would support the possibility that the same conclusion may hold for U.S. companies.
B. Competing Explanations for Change in the Cross-Listing Premium
Any effort to connect the adoption of SOX to a change in cross-listing premia must address competing explanations. It is not enough to observe that cross-listing premia declined in 2002, when SOX was adopted. Crosslisting premia might have declined for other reasons. My solution is to compare the premium for level-23 companies to the level-14 premium. This comparison factors out events that affect the general attractiveness of exposure to U.S. financial markets and provides a more focused look at the attractiveness of the extra regulation to which level-23 firms are subject. A central feature of my research design is that I study not only the cross-listing premium, but the difference in premia between level-23 and level-14 com-20 panies.
A second possibility is that the decline in the level-23 versus level-14 premium is due not to adoption of SOX, but to the scandals that prompted SOX, which led investors to believe that U.S. governance was not as good as it was previously believed to be. This explanation would predict that the prices of level-23 companies would decline during scandal events, but remain stable or even increase around the time of news announcements related to SOX. My prior research largely rules out this explanation. The prices of level-23 companies declined significantly relative to their non-cross-listed matches during SOX adoption events (and rose significantly during one event which indicated regulatory flexibility). There was no significant price reaction to the mid-2002 announcement of the WorldCom scandal.
'
Finally, companies that chose to cross-list on levels 2 or 3 might be systematically different from their peers that chose to cross-list on levels 1 or 4, or from those that chose not to cross-list at all. Although I control for a variety of company-level characteristics (such as size, profitability, industry, sales growth, pre-SOX level of unsystematic risk, leverage, the quality of disclosure, and so forth), it is possible that there is an unobserved difference that drives the result. It is possible, for example, that the same unobserved characteristic that caused firms to cross-list on level 2 or 3 in the first place later caused the decline in those firms' premia during the SOX year. This possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. Still, it seems unlikely, given the large number of robustness checks that I perform, and given the complementary findings of my event study paper. In addition, if the Act's requirements both improve firm governance and increase compliance costs, it is plausible that well-governed firms and firms from countries with high-quality corporate governance and institutional environment will realize smaller benefits than costs, and thus will be hurt more than poorly-governed firms and firms from countries with low-quality corporate governance and institutional environment. I therefore test the following sub-hypotheses:
Sub Critics argued that SOX increases managerial risk-aversion by penalizing non-traditional business strategies. If firms adopt risk levels in response to their unique needs, riskier firms may be hurt more by SOX because the reduction in risk imposes larger costs on them.
Sub-Hypothesis 5: Riskier cross-listed companies subject to SOX experienced larger declines in cross-listing premia during the period of SOX adoption than less risky companies. 
II. THE SAMPLE AND VARIABLES
A. Sample
Foreign securities can be listed in the United States on four different levels: (1) Level 1 ADRs are sold over-the-counter ("OTC") and require minimal SEC registration and no additional disclosure; (2) Level 2 ADRs are listed on U.S. securities exchanges, principally the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") or traded on the NASDAQ national market system; they must comply with the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and related SEC rules; (3) Level 3 ADRs involve a public offering of securities in the United States, typically followed by listing and trading on a U.S. exchange or the NASDAQ national market system; they must comply with the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act and related SEC rules; (4) Level 4 ADRs are for securities with trading limited to large institutional investors in the "PORTAL" market under SEC Rule 144A; they are not subject to SEC regulation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to foreign companies cross-listed on levels 2 and 3.
To 
B. Variables
To measure company-level governance, I use the measure of disclosure developed by Standard and Poor's in 2001, the year before SOX was 26 adopted. The S&P ratings have been used in the literature before. The total score is composed of three sub-scores-financial transparency and information disclosure, board and management structure and process, and I compute leverage as the book value of debt divided by the value of common equity; after missing observations are dropped, the set of SOXaffected matched pairs shrinks from 385 to 322.
I compute Tobin's q as follows: For the numerator, I use the sum of book value of preferred shares, market value of common shares, and book value of debt. For the denominator, I ise book value of assets. After missing observations are eliminated, the set of level-23 pairs shrinks from 385 to 319.
As a measure of profitability, I use net income margin: the ratio of net income before preferred dividends over total sales. After eliminating firms with missing data, I reduce the size of the level-23 set from 385 to 304. I measure unsystematic risk as the standard deviation of a firm's abnormal returns during 2001, relative to a country-level market index. 
V)
III. METHODOLOGY I measure cross-listing premia in two ways: on a pair level and on an individual company level. The methodology is the same with Tobin's q and market-to-book as the dependent variable; the discussion below assumes the dependent variable is Tobin's q.
A. After-Minus-Before Differences
I use year-end 2002 as the after-SOX measurement date and year-end 2001 as the before-SOX date. Regulatory events related to SOX and its application to foreign companies begin in January 2002 and continue through October 2002." 1 am interested in the after-minus-before change in Tobin's q. For company-level results, I calculate ln(Tobin's q) at year-end 2001 ("before") and year-end 2002 ("after") for each cross-listed company and each non-cross-listed matching firm, winsorized at 1%/99%, and an afterminus-before change in the winsorized values (6lnQ). I also compute two country-level indices: (i) "Index Level-14 Cross-Listed Companies" (I,4) which equals the median for each country of 6lnQ for level-14 companies, and (ii) "Index Non Cross Listed Companies (Ij,), which equals the median for each country of 81nQ for non-cross-listed companies.
For each matched pair, I calculate a "pair premium" (PP) at year-end 2001 and year-end 2002. The pair premium is ln(Tobin's q of a cross-listed company minus the Tobin's q of its match), which I then winsorize at 1%/99%. I then compute the after-minus-before difference in the pair premium (DDQ). For each country, I also compute a "Matched Pairs Index 14" (IMP4) that equals the median of DDQ for level-14 companies.
This pair premium captures the value of exposure to U.S. markets and, for level-23 firms, U.S. regulation, as perceived by investors. It also captures any other sources of differences in Tobin's q that are not captured by the match on country and industry and the rough match on size. These differences are known to be important-for example, firms that cross-list generally have higher growth prospects than apparently similar firms that do not cross-list. Tobin's q values and, even more so, market/book ratios are prone to outliers, typically for firms with high levels of intangible assets or very low book values (often reflecting prior losses). To reduce the effect of outliers, I winsorize all observations at 1%/99%, as noted above. In robustness checks (not reported), I winsorize at different levels, do not take logarithms, and exclude outliers rather than winsorizing. Results for ln(Tobin's q) are similar; results for ln(market/book) are similar but somewhat weaker without winsorizing or excluding outliers; results without taking logs are weaker, and regression standard errors may also be biased due to non-normality of the residuals. More formally, let c index countries, I index listing level (1 = 23, 14, or match), i index the n cross-listed companies (for convenience, let i cumulate across all firms in all countries), t index year, and n 23 (n, 4 ) be the number of level-23 (level-14) firms in the sample. Let Q, 23 i,, be the Tobin's q of level-23 cross-listed company i, from country c, on level 23, at time t, and similarly for level-14 and non-cross-listed companies. We are interested in the change in company and pair premia:
Companies:
Matched Pairs:
For all level-23 companies, the mean after-minus-before change in ln(Tobin's q) is
And similarly for level-14 firms and non-cross-listed firms.
The difference between the change in mean ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed firms on level 23 and the change for non-cross-listed firms is At1n Q23 = Sin Q23 -S1n Qmatch And similarly for the difference between level-14 firms and non-cross-listed firms.
For matched pairs, the analogous difference in means is 1
And similarly for level-14 pairs and all pairs. Computational dissimilarities (based on when we take logs) aside, the "companies" and "pairs" differences in means differ only because the comparison set of non-cross-listed companies for the "companies difference" A6lnQ 23 includes all non-cross-listed companies in the sample, not only the matches for the level-23 companies.
Finally, for companies, I compute the difference between (the difference in mean ln(Tobin's q) for level-23 firms versus matching firms) and (the analogous difference for level-14 firms versus-matching firms):
For matched pairs, I similarly compute the difference between (the mean after-minus-before difference in pair premia for level-23 pairs) and (the mean after-minus-before difference in pair premia for level-14 pairs), as
TDQ 23 -14 = (DDQ23 -DDQ,4)
The difference between (level-23 differences versus non-cross-listed firms) and (level-14 differences versus cross-listed firms) should hopefully control for other factors that affect the attractiveness of U.S. equity markets generally.
Computational dissimilarities aside, the "companies" and "pairs" differences in differences-in-means are again quite similar. The principal distinction is that in the companies specification, each group is not first compared to its firm-specific matches. The estimates will differ primarily if the mean change in Tobin's q for the level-23 matches differs from the mean change in Tobin's q for the level-14 matches.
The ASlnQ variable for company-level results (DDQ for matched pairs) can be understood as a difference-in-difference estimate. 5 For pairs, for example, the pair premium (difference in Tobin's q between a cross-listed firm and its match) is the first difference, and the before-to-after difference in pair premia is the second difference. The ThlnQ variable for company results (TDQ variable for matched pairs) can be understood as a triple difference estimate.
B. Regression Analysis: Cross-Sectional Variation
I also conduct regression estimates of the firm-level or pair-level afterminus-before change in Tobin's q, and the factors that predict crosssectional variation in firm (pair) changes. Consider first regressions with the sample limited to level-23 companies or pairs. For level-23 companies, the regression equation analogous to triple differences is
The coefficient a on the constant term gives the estimated before-to-after change in Tobin's q for level-23 companies. The 14 and I, indices control for country-level changes in mean Tobin's q for level-14 companies and non-cross-listed companies. All regressions also include country random effects to control for country-level factors that affect Tobin's q but are not captured by these indices. In robustness checks, I also use country fixed effects, with similar results (not reported). I present random effects specifications because this allows me to report the coefficients on countrylevel variables; these variables are dropped with country fixed effects.
For level-23 pairs, the analogous regression equation is simply The coefficient a on the constant term gives the estimated before-to-after change in In(pair difference in Tobin's q) for level-23 pairs. For matched pairs, the analogous regression is DD, ~i = a +r %*dum23 +7 *IMP14 +Ec,l,i
In both regressions, the coefficient X on the level-23 dummy gives the estimated change in ln(Tobin's q), controlling for changes in Tobin's q for level-14 and non-cross-listed firms.
These regression equations can be extended to assess the importance of firm-level characteristics (for example, size, sales growth, firm-level disclosure) and country-level characteristics (for example, GDP, country-level disclosure quality, or creditor rights) in predicting cross-sectional variation in the after-minus-before change in Tobin's q. Let Xi be a vector of firm and country characteristics, indexed by j. Consider first a regression limited to level-23 companies or pairs. We can estimate, for companies In both equations, the 13j provide estimates of the effect of the X on the afterminus-before change in Tobin's q. The coefficients woj on the interaction terms give the predicted effect of the firm-level or country-level variable on the difference in after-minus-before Tobin's q (or market/book ratio) between level-23 and level-14 companies (pairs).
IV. RESULTS Table 2 presents basic results for the changes in cross-listing premia before and after SOX adoption. The pre-SOX period is defined as the year-end 2001 and post-SOX period as the year-end 2002. As a robustness check, I narrow down the before-and-after period to the interval between April and October of 2002, when most of the important SOX-related information was 36 released, with similar results . 36 . For details on relevant dates of information releases, see Litvak, supra note 10,.
TABLE 2 AFTER SOX (YEAR-END 2002) MINUS BEFORE SOX (YEAR-END 2001) CHANGES IN LN(TOBIN'S Q) AND LN(MARKET/BOOK RATIO)
All panels: Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.
Panel A: Mean after (2002) minus before (2001) changes in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies separated by listing level (Column 2) and for all non-crosslisted companies (Column 3). The double difference is reported in Column 4, and its statistical significance is reported in Columns 5 and 6. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%.
PANEL A: RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES, LN(TOBIN'S Q)
Xlisted
All Panel B: Mean after-minus-before change in the difference between ln(Tobin's q of cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q of non-cross-listed match), for all matched pairs (row 1), level-23 pairs (row 2) and level-14 pairs (row 3). Each pair consists of one cross-listed company and a match from the same country, same industry, and similar in size. The double difference is reported in Column 4 and its statistical significance is in Columns 5 and 6. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Panel C: Similar to Panel A except it uses ln(market-to-book ratio) instead of ln(Tobin's q).
PANEL B: RESULTS FOR MATCHED PAIRS, LN(TOBIN'S Q)
PANEL C: RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES, LN (MARKET-TO-BOOK RATIO)
Xlisted
All Panel A contains the results of a single-company approach. Column 2 contains mean after-minus-before SOX changes in Tobin's q for cross-listed companies, separately for those subject to SOX (Row 2) and those not subject to SOX (Row 3). Next, I determine whether Tobin's q of cross-listed companies subject to SOX also declined as compared to non-cross-listed companies.
The after-minus-before SOX changes in Tobin's q of non-cross-listed companies are reported in Column 3; Column 4 reports double differences. During 2002, the average Tobin's q of all groups of foreign companies declined, but it declined most strongly in companies subject to SOX. Level-23 companies lost on average 17% of their Tobin's q, which is 7.2 % more than the loss of non-cross-listed companies from the same country. Level-14 companies lost on average 6.7 percent of their Tobin's q. The difference between the loss of level-23 companies and the loss of non-cross-listed companies is statistically significant, as reported in Columns 5 and 6. Likewise, the difference between the declines of level-23 companies and level-14 companies is significant (Column 2, Rows 4 and 5). That is, SOX-affected firms lost more value that either category of SOX-unaffected firms. The difference between the loss of level-14 companies and the loss of non-cross-listed companies is significant, but with the opposite sign. That is, the premia of SOX-affected cross-listed firms declined significantly, while the premia of other cross-listed firms increased. This supports the view that investors reacted negatively to the contents of SOX and separated cross-listed companies subject to SOX from cross-listed companies not subject to SOX.
Panel B looks at matched pairs rather than individual companies. There is a drop in sample size, due to the need for data on Tobin's q for two firms at two dates. Pair premium is calculated as ln(Tobin's q of a cross-listed company minus a Tobin's q of its non-cross-listed match), separately for the before-SOX period (Column 2) and the after-SOX period (Column 3). As Rows 4 and 5 show, both before and after SOX, level-23 pairs had higher pair premia than level-14 pairs, but the difference is not significant. Panels C and D parallel Panels A and B, but they use market-to-book ratios as an alternative measure of cross-listing premia, with similar results. As Panel C shows, mean market-to-book ratios of level-23 companies declined significantly during 2002 (by 23.7%), while mean market-to-book ratios of level-14 companies and non-cross-listed companies declined only slightly (9.6% and 9.7%, respectively). As Columns 5 and 6 report, the difference is significant for level-23 companies, but not for level-14 companies. The difference between these two groups is significant. That is, premia of SOX-affected cross-listed firms declined compared to both control groups, but premia of SOX-unaffected cross-listed firms did not change significantly.
Likewise, as Panel D shows, mean premium of level-23 pairs was 16.3% before SOX (Column 2) and declined by 4.4% after SOX (Column 4). At the same time, pair premia of level-14 pairs declined only slightly, by 0.8 percent (Column 4). The decline is statistically significant for level-23 pairs, but not for level-14 pairs (Columns 5 and 6).
In short, foreign companies cross-listed in the United States, but not exposed to SOX, exhibited changes in market-to-book ratios similar to those of foreign companies not cross-listed in the United States. The decline of level-23 firms appears to be driven by the exposure to SOX itself, not by general trends common to all companies traded in the United States.
The four panels of Table 2 provide four different measures of changes in cross-listing premia, and the results are similar. Three panels support the view that cross-listing premia of companies subject to SOX declined after the adoption of SOX, as compared to the changes in premia of non-crosslisted companies or cross-listed companies not subject to SOX. One panel (Panel B) contains insignificant results. Table 3 presents basic regression results. Panel A reports after-minusbefore changes for single companies, with Tobin's q (Columns 1 and 2) and market-to-book ratios (Columns 3 and 4) as measures of premia. I control for contemporaneous events by using two hand-collected indices: a median after-minus-before SOX change in ln(Tobin's q) for companies cross-listed on level 1 or 4 (this controls for exposure to U.S. markets without exposure to SOX), and a median after-minus-before SOX change in ln(Tobin's q) for non cross-listed companies (this controls for contemporaneous homecountry events). I also control for company size and home country GDP per capita.
In Columns 1 and 3, the sample is all foreign companies, listed on all levels. The coefficient of interest is that on the "Dummy-23" variable. This coefficient is negative and significant at a 1% level for both Tobin's q and market-to-book specifications. In Columns 2 and 4, I limit the sample to level-23 companies only; the coefficient of interest is on the constant term. This coefficient is negative and significant in both specifications. That is, foreign companies subject to SOX experienced significant declines in crosslisting premia as compared to foreign companies cross-listed in the United States but not subject to SOX.
TABLE 3 BASIC REGRESSIONS FOR LN(TOBIN'S Q) AND LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK)
Panel A: Single Companies. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is the firm-level after (2002) minus before (2001) change in ln(Tobin's q) for crosslisted companies. In Columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the after-minusbefore difference in ln(market-to-book ratio). The independent variables are the following: "Dummy-23" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is listed on level 2 or 3; ln(assets); ln(GDP per capita); "Level-14 Index" is the country-level median of the after-minus-before difference in the dependent variable for crosslisted level-14 companies; "Non-Cross-Listed Index" is the country-level median of the after-minus-before difference in the dependent variable for non cross-listed companies, and a constant term. In Columns 1 and 3, the sample is all cross-listed companies on all levels; the coefficient of interest is on Dummy-23. In Columns 2 and 4, the sample is limited to level-23 companies; the coefficient of interest is on the constant term. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Both double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. In Columns I and 2, the dependent variable is the double difference of In(Tobin's q) for matched pairs: after-minus-before difference in In(Tobin's q for cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q for non-cross-listed match). In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is similarly defined as double difference in In(market-to-book). The independent variables are Dummy-23; In(assets of crosslisted firm); In(GDP per capita); an index for the country-level median of the double difference for level-14 pairs ("Matched Pairs Index 14"), and a constant term. In Columns I and 3, the sample is all matched pairs on all levels; the coefficient of interest is on Dummy-23. In Columns 2 and 4, the sample is limited to level-23 matched pairs; the coefficient of interest is on the constant term. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. Panel B presents the results of the same tests for matched pairs, rather than single companies. The results are similar in magnitude to those reported in Panel A, but weaker statistically, likely because of the smaller sample size. The Level-23 dummy is now significant only at a 10% level for Tobin's q specification and is not significant for market-to-book specification. The constant terms in Columns 2 and 4, however, are consistently strong and negative. In this table, I control for contemporaneous events in two ways: (1) by using matched pairs as a dependent variable, and (2) by using a hand-collected index of median changes in Tobin's q among level-14 matched pairs. Other controls are similar to Panel A.
The overall result is a strong decline in cross-listing premia of foreign companies subject to SOX, controlling for reactions of otherwise similar foreign companies not subject to SOX-both cross-listed and non-crosslisted. This is consistent with the view that investors of foreign cross-listed companies believed SOX to be a net negative. The next question is which country-or company-level characteristics predict changes in cross-listing premia. Table 4 reports country-level results both for Tobin's q and for marketto-book ratios. For each country, it compares the average change in ln(Tobin's q) or ln(market/book) for level-23 firms with the average change for non-cross-listed firms. Table 4 lists the following data: mean after (2002) minus before (2001) change in In(Tobin's q) for level-23 firms (Column 2) and for non-cross-listed firms (Column 3); the difference between changes in level-23 and non-cross-listed fims (Column 3), and statistical significance of the double difference (Columns 4 and 5). Columns 6-9 do the same for market-to-book ratios. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Significant or marginally significant results (at 10% level or better) are in boldface.
TABLE 4 COUNTRY-LEVEL RESULTS FOR SINGLE COMPANIES (LEVEL-23 VERSUS NON-CROSS-LISTED)
In(Tobin's 0)
In ( In these tbsIa wi C-0 company-or country-level characteristics predict post-SOX changes in cross-listing premia. Tables 6-8 look at Tobin's q changes in individual companies, Table 9 looks at Tobin's q changes in matched pairs, and Table  10 looks at market-to-book changes in both individual companies and matched pairs. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. Country fixed effects produce similar results (not reported). Panel A uses all cross-listed companies and interactions between variables of interest with the dummy for level-23 listing. Strong predictors are the S&P measure of disclosure (negative), firm asset size (positive), pre-SOX profitability (negative), and the degree of a firm's ownership concentration (negative, marginally significant). A firm's unsystematic risk is a negative predictor, marginally significant and not always robust. Panel B limits the sample to level-23 companies. Again, the S&P measure of disclosure is a strong negative predictor of after-SOX changes in Tobin's q; firm asset size is a positive predictor; and profitability is a negative predictor (not always robust). Pre-SOX unsystematic risk is now a strong and consistently negative predictor.
TABLE 6 CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COMPANY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Both Panels: the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001) difference in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are winsorized at 1%/99%. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy23; Level-14 Index; NonCross-Listed Index (all defined in Table 3 .
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These results are consistent with the view that investors perceived SOX as a net negative for cross-listed companies overall and that the biggest losers were well-governed companies and smaller companies. These findings also support the view that SOX may have penalized corporate risk-taking.
In Table 7 , I move to country-level predictors. As in Table 6 , Panel A uses all cross-listed companies and interactions between variables of interest with the dummy for level-23 listing. Panel B limits the sample to level-23 companies.
I construct a new country-level measure of disclosure, equal to the country median (for my sample) of company-level measures of disclosure provided by S&P. In both panels, this country-level measure of disclosure emerges as the strongest negative predictor of post-SOX changes in Tobin's q.
Country ln(GDP per capita) also negatively predicts reaction to SOX; however, this result does not survive when country-level disclosure is also included. Spamann's measure of anti-director rights is another negative predictor, but it is statistically significant only in one specification. I do not find significance for other country-level economic variables (number of IPOs per capita) and legal variables (LLSV measure of antidirector rights and the quality of the accounting system). I also check whether political economy variables developed by Mark Roe" predict changes in a company's Tobin's q around SOX. None of those variables emerges as a significant predictor, either alone or in combination with other variables (only results for Labor Regulation are reported). TABLE 7 CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS: COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES Both Panels: the dependent variable is the after (2002) minus before (2001) difference in ln(Tobin's q) for cross-listed companies. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are winsorized at 1%/99%. Other controls include ln(assets); profitability, and sales growth. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy23; Index Level-14 CrossListed Companies; Index Non-Cross-Listed Companies (all defined in In Table 8 , I combine company-and country-level characteristics. Panel A presents the results for all cross-listed companies, with variables of interest interacted with the level-23 dummy. Panel B limits the sample to level-23 companies. I use the original S&P firm-level measure of disclosure, rather than the country-level measure used in Table 7 . The results are similar, but not identical, to those reported in Tables 6 and 7 . The quality of a firm's pre-SOX disclosure loses its significance. Firm size remains a strong positive predictor. Firm profitability and unsystematic risk, along with home country GDP per capita, are all strong negative predictors. Spamann's measure of antidirector rights is a negative predictor as well, but only marginally significant. Table 3 ); additional variables listed in the table, and interactions between these variables and Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies. Panel B is limited to level-23 companies; independent variables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and its interactions are omitted. Differences in ln(Tobin's q) are winsorized at 1%/99%. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. Table 9 presents the results of matched-pairs analysis of changes in Tobin's q. As discussed before, sample size declines significantly in matched pairs specification, which makes the results less reliable. Nevertheless, the results are similar to those obtained in the single-company approach. Level-23 matched pairs experienced significant declines in Tobin's q, as compared to level-14 matched pairs. Among company-level variables, firm size remains a positive predictor and pre-SOX unsystematic risk is a negative predictor. On a country level, Spamann's measure of antidirector rights is a significant negative predictor (albeit not in Panel B, where the sample size is small), and GDP per capita is a negative predictor as well. Disclosure, which was significant in Tables 6 and 7 , is not significant in Tables 8 and 9 ; this might be due to the high correlation between disclosure and GDP per capita (r = 0.55). Table 8 , except it uses matched pairs instead of individual companies. Both Panels: the dependent variable is after-minus-before difference in ln(Tobin's q for cross-listed firm minus Tobin's q for non-cross-listed match). Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
In Panel A, the independent variables are: Dummy-23; an index for the countrylevel median of the double difference for level-14 pairs ("Matched Pairs Index 14"); additional variables listed in the table, and interactions between these variables and Dummy-23. Panel A includes all cross-listed companies. Panel B is limited to level-23 companies. All variables are the same, except that Dummy-23 and interactions are replaced with non-interacted variables.
Finally, in Table 10 , I measure cross-listing premia based on market-tobook ratio, rather than Tobin's q. Columns 2-5 report the results for single companies; Columns 7-10 report the results for matched pairs. Panels A and C include all cross-listed firms; Panels B and D limit the sample to firms (pairs) listed on levels 2 or 3. The results are similar to the results for Tobin's q. Level-23 firms and pairs experienced significant overall declines in market-to-book ratios, as compared to level-14 firms and pairs. Among firm-level variables, firm size is a strong positive predictor of changes in market-to-book ratios, and profitability is a negative predictor. Higher unsystematic risk of a firm predicts a reduction in cross-listing premia in some specifications. Disclosure is not significant (not reported). Non-dummy independent variables are standardized to mean = 0; a = 1. Double differences are winsorized at 1%/99%. All regressions use country random effects with robust standard errors, country clusters. T-statistics are reported under regression coefficients. Symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR DETERMINING THE EFFICACY OF SOX
This article and my prior event study suggest that the adoption of SOX had larger costs than benefits for at least some cross-listed firms, especially firms that were already likely to be well-governed. These overall findings do not tell us which provisions of SOX are associated with the negative reaction of investors of cross-listed firms. Perhaps SOX contains "good" provisions (for which benefits exceed costs) as well as "bad" ones. It is also possible that benefits exceeded costs for some firms, even if not on average. Which provisions are "good" or "bad" could also depend on a firm's home country environment and on other firm characteristics.
I therefore propose the following policy experiment, which will both preserve the financial incentives for foreign firms to cross-list on level 2 or 3, and help us assess which provisions of SOX are likely to be helpful or harmful-at least for cross-listed firms. The SEC could exempt cross-listed firms from SOX compliance and instead allow them to adopt a "comply or explain" approach, of a sort familiar from the corporate governance codes of many countries, including the Combined Code in the United Kingdom. 39 The comply-or-explain approach could potentially stem the current flight of foreign issuers to overseas markets, and allow cross-listed firms to recover the share price losses they appear to have suffered when SOX was adopted. These firms' decisions on when to comply could also inform policy judgments about whether and how to relax particular provisions of SOX for U.S. firms. Event studies of share price reactions to foreign firms' decisions to explain rather than comply could shed light on whether the choice not to comply was good for shareholders. Evidence on investor reaction could then form the basis for extending the comply-or-explain flexibility to U.S. issuers, perhaps starting with smaller issuers, who are considered to bear a greater burden relative to their size from SOX compliance costs.
The overall comply-or-explain approach moves in the direction of proposals by Roberta Romano,4° and by Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, 4 ' for regulatory competition in securities regulation for public firms. This
The methodology used in this paper does not allow me to assess causation, but the use of double and triple differences presents evidence in favor of a causal connection between adoption of SOX and my results, absent another explanation for why the share prices of level-23 firms should have declined relative to level-14 firms and relative to non-cross-listed firms during this period.
In all single-company specifications, cross-listing premia of foreign companies subject to SOX declined significantly, as compared to matched non-cross-listed companies from the same country, the same industry, and similar in size, and as compared to non-cross-listed companies from the same country. At the same time, cross-listing premia for foreign companies not subject to SOX declined substantially less (and, in some specifications, insignificantly increased). This suggests that the mere exposure to U.S. capital markets does not explain the declines in cross-listing premia suffered by cross-listed firms subject to SOX. Matched pair results are consistent in sign and magnitude, though less significant statistically.
I also assess the factors that predict cross-sectional variation in the change in cross listing premia during 2002. Companies that were already high-disclosing (or from high-disclosing countries) suffered the largest adverse effect. Cross-listing premia declined more for profitable and riskier firms, and declined less for larger firms. These results suggest that the relative benefits and costs of SOX may depend on companies' pre-SOX governance and other country-level and firm-level characteristics.
This article and my prior event study have similar but not identical results. Both find a significant negative investor reaction to SOX for level-23 cross-listed companies. Both find that well-governed firms and firms from countries with high-quality laws and institutions reacted more negatively. Country-and company-level measures of pre-SOX disclosure, home countries' GDP per capita, and several measures of home countries' investor protection laws are significant predictors of reaction to SOX in both papers. There are a few differences. This paper finds that larger firms reacted less negatively; the event study does not find an effect based on size. The event study finds a positive effect based on sales growth; this paper does not.
It is hard to tell which results are more likely to be "correct." This paper looks over a longer time period and therefore deals with the possibility of a short-term investor overreaction; this approach, however, introduces noise and possible confounding events. The event study paper looks at the market reaction during narrow event windows, often only one-or two-days; thus, it cannot address the short-term overreaction problem, but it provides a more rigorous control for contemporaneous events unrelated to SOX.
